US Plans to Lift Sanctions on Iran Under Framework Agreement
US framework would seek to lift all types of sanctions on Iran, including UN Security Council measures, as part of a wider diplomatic settlement.
The United States says a recently discussed framework seeks to lift sanctions on Iran, including both unilateral measures and United Nations Security Council resolutions, marking a major potential shift in Washington’s approach to Tehran. The proposal, according to officials briefed on the plan, would address a wide array of restrictions tied to Iran’s nuclear program, missile activities, alleged support for armed groups, and human rights abuses. If implemented, the move would involve complex negotiations with international partners and careful unwinding of layered sanctions regimes that have been built up over decades.
Scope of sanctions the US aims to remove
The framework contemplates removal of sanctions tied to Iran’s nuclear activities as well as those linked to support for groups designated by the US as terrorist organizations, including Hezbollah and Hamas. It also targets human-rights-related restrictions and measures connected to Iran’s missile program, reflecting the multiplicity of sanctions authorities Washington has relied upon. Many of these measures are interlocking: unilateral US sanctions, secondary measures aimed at non-US firms, and, in some cases, United Nations Security Council resolutions that required multilateral endorsement.
Historical layers that shaped today’s sanctions
US sanctions against Iran date back to the 1979 seizure of the American embassy in Tehran, after which Washington imposed initial asset freezes and trade limits; the last hostages were released in early 1981. During the Iran–Iraq War the United States designated Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism, a label that has carried export controls, aid restrictions, and other financial penalties ever since. Subsequent administrations expanded that toolkit: President Bill Clinton used executive orders in the 1990s to tighten trade and investment limits, and later laws and regulations broadened measures against Iran’s energy and financial sectors.
Secondary sanctions and the risk to third‑party companies
A central practical obstacle is the US use of secondary sanctions that penalize non‑US companies for engaging in certain activities with Iran, an approach designed to deter foreign investment in Tehran’s energy sector and financial system. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act — rebranded as the Iran Sanctions Act and repeatedly renewed since its adoption — has been a key instrument in persuading international firms to withdraw or refrain from deals with Iran. Under the proposed framework, Washington would need to reverse these secondary restrictions or provide legal assurances to global banks and energy firms that previously faced the risk of US penalties.
Nuclear diplomacy and the legacy of the JCPOA
The 2015 nuclear deal — the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — resulted in targeted relief from nuclear-related sanctions, particularly in oil, petrochemicals, shipping and finance, in exchange for limits on Iran’s enrichment program. However, many non‑nuclear sanctions, notably those addressing terrorism, human rights and missile development, remained in place. The US withdrawal in 2018 under President Donald Trump led to the reimposition of sanctions removed under the JCPOA and a broader campaign of “maximum pressure.” Any effort to lift sanctions now must reckon with the mixed legacy of the JCPOA and the political resistance in capitals that previously saw value in maintaining certain restrictions.
UN and EU constraints on unilateral US action
Unlike US domestic measures, United Nations Security Council resolutions and European Union sanctions cannot be rescinded unilaterally by Washington; they require agreement within their respective bodies. In other words, persuading other Security Council members to roll back UN measures and winning EU political consensus are prerequisites for fully lifting all sanctions cited in the framework. That multilateral dimension raises diplomatic hurdles, since EU restrictions dating back to 2007 and 2011 were adopted on concerns including the nuclear program and human rights, and member states will weigh regional stability and legal obligations in any decision.
The proposed rollback would also need to address penalties targeting Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and related entities, which have been designated under both national and international pressure for their role in regional proxy activity. Untangling sanctions that target individuals, military units and commercial firms requires extensive legal drafting to avoid creating loopholes that could be exploited for prohibited activities.
The path from framework to implementation will hinge on concrete sequencing, legal guarantees for third‑party actors, and coordinated action at the UN and EU levels. Tehran gains relief only if counterparties and markets trust that banking channels will reopen and that businesses can resume commerce without facing secondary penalties. Conversely, Washington must secure assurances that Iranian behavior on proliferation, regional proxies and human rights will be addressed through verifiable measures. The coming weeks of diplomacy will test whether the complex architecture of sanctions built over four decades can be dismantled in a controlled, enforceable way that satisfies both domestic political constraints and international partners.
